Industrial, commercial, corporate and economic espionage in Russia: concept, responsibility under Article 183 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation

Here are 5 notable cases of industrial espionage over the past few decades. Industrial espionage, sometimes also called economic espionage, is a very serious crime that can carry very heavy fines and penalties. It is quite common and can give a competitor a huge advantage in the commercial market. Here we have collected 5 notable examples of industrial espionage in recent times and tried to answer some common questions on this topic.

What is a trade secret

According to the indications and concepts of Federal Law No. 98, this term refers to a set of materials of a different nature (financial, tax, production, etc.), which also includes the result of intellectual work in the field of science, technology, as well as information about basic methods work.

Information that is generally considered secret in practice must meet a number of basic requirements:

have a specific financial value, which explains their secrecy;
inaccessibility to third parties on a legal basis;
have a special regime related to the preservation of trade secrets.

Tax secret

We examined the essence and concept of a trade secret. One of its aspects and directions is tax secrecy. In accordance with the standards prescribed in Art. 102nd Tax Code of the Russian Federation, NT means a set of information about payers that was obtained by:

investigative organizations;
tax offices;
representatives of the internal affairs department;
off-budget federal funds;
customs companies.

And from 2021, this category also includes information about the amounts of insurance payments made by taxpayers. The Tax Code (Article 102) also states that it has nothing to do with NT:

data on tax reporting documents;
materials on the number of employees of the company;
information about taxation systems for the population;
information about insurance contributions and their tariff features;
non-compliance with regulations in the field of fees.

In Art. 183 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation it is noted that a certain amount of responsibility is assigned for illegal acts , because they can cause direct or indirect damage to the company itself.

Competitive intelligence

Competitive (business) intelligence is the legal collection of publicly available information with its subsequent processing to further determine solutions that increase competitiveness.

Collection of information

Unlike espionage, information is collected legally from available open sources. Data can be taken from:

reviews;
surveys;
research;
interviews with competitor representatives;
published reports;
personal experience of relationships with a competitor’s products or services;
marketing activity;
etc.

Information analysis

If a significant amount of data has been collected, then very important preparation will be required before analysis. It is necessary to highlight those segments that need to be omitted in further analysis.

At this stage, significant difficulties are likely to arise, so the segments, for a start, can be divided into clusters and several (if possible, parallel) analyzes can be carried out.

After this, you can start working with the collected information. Identify negativity and positivity in relation to competitors from the outside, evaluate the emergence of new or strengthening of old sales channels, possible changes in the emphasis of a competitor’s work.

As a result of the analysis, we must obtain the most complete picture of the competitor’s situation. Strengths and weaknesses, as well as plans for development or termination of activity in certain areas.

Based on the findings, we must formulate a plan for further action, marketing and other activities. Offer everything that increases our competitiveness and at the same time remains within the framework of the law.

Risk assessment

At the final stage, we assess the risks of adopting the plan from the previous paragraph. To what extent can the proposed steps undermine our financial condition? Are such changes at odds with the philosophy, established image and mission of the company?

If the result of information analysis implies structural changes affecting established business processes, then the likely consequences are difficult or almost impossible to predict.

Based on this, the logical and least painful way would be a gradual (if possible) change with a deep analysis of the consequences after each stage.

Otherwise, the likely negative consequences may take on an avalanche-like or, even worse, linear form, according to the “domino effect” principle.

It is also important to consider that some of the changes can be “rolled back”, while others will lead to reaching a “point of no return”, after which it will become impossible or too costly to return to the previous model.

Corpus delicti

Objects are social relationships involving the fulfillment of obligations for commercial work. Items – data acting as secrets of a commercial, banking, tax, industrial nature, disclosed to third parties. Objective aspects are actions combined through the concept of data collection. For example, this is bribery, theft, hacking.

The norms of the law deal with the formal elements of the crime. This only means that the criminal is assigned guilt the moment he receives the data, even if he did not have time to transfer it to third parties interested.

The subject of the committed criminal act is a citizen who has reached the age of 16. The subjective side is direct and immediate intent, accompanied by the desire to acquire personal gain.

Responsibility for industrial espionage also arises in the following situations:

if the suspect collected information personally or through the use of special equipment or third parties;
kept information inaccessible to society without having a privileged right to do so;
recruited agents in order to obtain a chance to gain access to classified information;
transferred or planned to transfer information to third parties.

Evidence

The following elements serve as objects of evidence for the presence of espionage:

video materials;
audio recordings found on the suspect during the investigation;
found diagrams and drawings, other graphic materials.

Everything that is found in the archive of the culprit will play against his interests in the trial.

Commercial espionage: criminal legal characteristics
A. A. Rybchinsky,
legal adviser
[email protected]
The proposed article is written in the form of a scientific and practical commentary on Art. 183 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation and is devoted to the issues of criminal legal characteristics of commercial espionage.
Progress in the field of information technology and the strengthening role of information in economic activity have given impetus to the development of two interrelated, but opposite in nature, trends. On the one hand, in order to ensure a stable position in the market, further progressive development, as well as to ensure the very possibility of making a profit in the process of carrying out business activities, the owner of information that has commercial value is interested in ensuring its confidentiality, protection from disclosure, its unlawful acquisition and use. At the same time, a real fact in modern business activity is that many commercial organizations carry out so-called business intelligence, which, in turn, can be both legal and illegal. Moreover, if the task in both cases is, in principle, the same - obtaining information, albeit of a slightly different nature, then the methods used to achieve it are completely different in nature.
Thus, the implementation of legal business intelligence involves the use of methods that are absolutely legitimate from the point of view of legislation: conducting independent marketing research, analyzing the financial and other position of the counterparty on the basis of documents of established forms of reporting on financial and economic activities, expert assessments and consultations, forecasting, etc.
In turn, the main goal of illegal business intelligence, or, as it is also called, commercial espionage, is to provide interested subjects with information that has commercial value and provides the opportunity to obtain certain advantages in the market over competitors in a particular area that is identified them as confidential. At the same time, the characteristic features of this type of activity are: the use of illegal methods to achieve this goal and violation of the rights and legitimate interests of other business entities.
The social danger of this act lies in the fact that from the monopoly possession of the owner of information constituting a trade secret, without his consent, information comes out that he uses or can use in the process of carrying out business activities to make a profit, thereby causing damage to the owner of the information, worsening his position and competitiveness in the market or damaging its business reputation. In this case, the subject of the crime or other interested parties have the opportunity to independently use the specified information to obtain their own benefit.
Accordingly, an act of this kind was defined by the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation as a crime, that is, a socially dangerous act committed with guilt, prohibited by criminal law under threat of punishment.
It should be noted that in Russian legislation there is no term “commercial espionage”, as, for example, it is defined by the Criminal Code of the Republic of Belarus (see Article 254 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Belarus). This term, like the concept of “business intelligence,” is slang and is used mainly by specialists. The legal definition of these acts is as follows: “illegal receipt, disclosure and use of information constituting a trade secret.”
Russian antimonopoly legislation defines the receipt, disclosure, and use of information constituting a trade secret, without the consent of the owner of the information, as one of the forms of unfair competition (Article 10 of the RSFSR Law “On Competition and Restriction of Monopolistic Activities in Commodity Markets” No. 948-1 of March 22, 1991 city, Article 15 of the Federal Law “On the Protection of Competition in the Financial Services Market” No. 117-FZ of July 23, 1999).
The Information Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation, adopted on September 28, 2000, establishes as one of the types of significant threats to the normal functioning of business entities the illegal disclosure, use for criminal or other mercenary purposes of information constituting a trade secret, as well as unauthorized access to it and disclosure of information of this kind (see Section I “Information Security of the Russian Federation”, Chapter 2 “Types of Threats to Information Security of the Russian Federation”, Section II “Methods of Ensuring Information Security of the Russian Federation” Chapter 6 “Features of Ensuring Information Security in Various Spheres of Public Life” Information Security Doctrines Russian Federation dated September 28, 2000).
Provisions of Art. 183 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (CC RF) “Illegal receipt and disclosure of information constituting commercial, tax or banking secrets” regarding information constituting a commercial secret are formulated as follows:
1. Collecting information constituting a commercial secret by stealing documents, bribery or threats, as well as in any other illegal way, is punishable by a fine in the amount of one hundred to two hundred times the minimum wage or in the amount of the wages or other income of the convicted person for a period of one to two months. or imprisonment for a term of up to two years.
2. Illegal disclosure or use of information constituting a trade secret, without the consent of its owner, a person to whom it became known or was entrusted through service or work, is punishable by a fine in the amount of one hundred to two hundred times the minimum wage with deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for a term of up to three years or imprisonment for a term of up to three years.
3. The same acts that caused major damage or were committed out of selfish interest are punishable by a fine in the amount of two hundred to five hundred times the minimum wage with deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for a term of up to five years, or imprisonment for a term of up to five years. .
4. Acts provided for in parts two and three, which entail grave consequences, are punishable by imprisonment for a term of up to ten years.
Structurally, the article is located in Section VIII of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation “Crimes in the Sphere of Economic Activity” and is part of Chapter 22 “Crimes in the Sphere of Economic Activity”.
This article is a novelty in Russian criminal law and is one of the elements of the system of legal norms regulating the sphere of information relations and information security in the field of economic activity.
The article contains two general elements of a crime, as well as two additional elements with qualifying characteristics, the development and implementation of which were caused by the need for criminal legal protection of the right of ownership of information constituting a trade secret due to the fact that at the present stage of economic development information in the sphere of entrepreneurial activity has become one of the main factors of economic activity, in addition to those traditionally identified as capital, labor and natural resources.
The Information Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation classifies criminal law norms governing the protection of trade secrets as legal methods of ensuring information security of the Russian Federation (see Section II “Methods of ensuring information security of the Russian Federation”, Chapter 5 “General methods of ensuring information security of the Russian Federation”) .
The object of the crime is social relations that develop in the economic sphere in the process of carrying out business activities. The immediate object is the social relations that arise regarding the ownership of information that constitutes a trade secret.
The subject of the crime is information constituting a trade secret.
A trade secret is information that has actual or potential commercial value due to its unknownness to third parties, to which there is no free access on a legal basis and the owner takes measures to protect its confidentiality (Part 1 of Article 139 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation).
In addition, in order for certain information to receive the legal status of a trade secret, it must be documented, that is, recorded on a tangible medium with the appropriate details that allow it to be identified (see Part 1 of Article 5 of the Federal Law “On Information” , informatization and information protection" No. 24-FZ of February 20, 1995). Relations arising over undocumented information are not regulated by Russian legislation.
The decision to classify certain information as information constituting a trade secret is made by the owner of this information.
The owner of information constituting a trade secret is an individual or legal entity at whose expense the information was obtained or who acquired it legally, received it by gift or inheritance (Article 2 of the Federal Law “On Information, Informatization and Information Protection” No. 24-FZ of February 20, 1995).
At the same time, a number of regulatory legal acts stipulate a certain category of information that cannot be classified by the owner as information constituting a trade secret (see Part 3 of Article 10 of the Federal Law “On Information, Informatization and Information Protection” No. 24FZ dated 20 February 1995, Decree of the Government of the RSFSR “On the list of information that cannot constitute a commercial secret” No. 35 of December 5, 1991).
However, in order for certain information to be identified in the general flow of information and identified as a trade secret, the owner of the information constituting a trade secret must comply with the following procedure: develop and approve a List of information constituting a trade secret in relation to the specifics of the organization, and also the Regulations on the protection of trade secrets, which would regulate paperwork with documents containing information of this kind, the criteria and procedure for classifying information as information constituting a trade secret, the regime of trade secrets and a number of other issues. The passage of this procedure is a legal fact when information legally acquires the legal status of a trade secret and the corresponding regime and protection.
The objective side of Part 1 of Art. 183 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation includes actions to collect information constituting a trade secret through theft, bribery or threats, as well as other illegal means.
Collection is any action aimed at obtaining information constituting a trade secret, without the consent of the owner of the information, carried out by a person who does not have access to it on any legal basis, and associated with overcoming the protection regime for information constituting a trade secret.
The law specifies the following methods of collection:
theft of documents;
bribe;
threats;
other illegal methods.
Theft consists of the open or secret seizure of documents as material carriers of information constituting a trade secret from their owner or a person who has them on any legal basis.
Bribery is the transfer to a person who, by virtue of his official position, has access to information constituting a commercial secret, money, securities, or other property, as well as the provision of services of a property nature to him in order to obtain the specified information.
Threats - exerting mental influence on a person who, due to his official position, has access to information constituting a trade secret, indicating the possibility of real use of violent measures or the occurrence of any other adverse consequences for the specified person and carried out in order to obtain information constituting trade secret.
Other illegal means mean the commission of illegal actions that are not related to the types listed above, for example, by deception or misrepresentation.
It should be noted that if the very method of collecting information constituting a trade secret forms a separate crime, then it should be qualified in conjunction with Part 1 of Art. 183 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. For example, if the receipt of the specified information was accompanied by the intentional infliction of minor harm to health, then Part 1 of Art. 183 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation should be qualified in conjunction with Art. 115 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation “Intentional infliction of minor harm to health” or Art. 116 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation “Beatings”.
To qualify a crime you need:
a) the fact of unauthorized access to information;
b) the fact of the release of this information from the monopoly possession of the legal owner;
c) violation of the legal regime of information constituting a trade secret;
d) violation of the trade secret protection regime;
e) use of illegal methods to obtain information constituting commercial
secret.
The crime is committed with direct intent, that is, the subject is aware of the social danger of his actions and wants to commit them.
The onset of socially dangerous consequences of Part 1 of Art. 183 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation is not provided for. Accordingly, this allows us to say that this crime has a formal composition.
The subject of the crime is a sane individual who has reached the age of 16 and who does not have access to information constituting a trade secret.
Part 1 art. 183 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation is a crime of minor gravity.
The objective side of Part 2 of Art. 183 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation includes illegal disclosure or use of information constituting a trade secret, committed without the consent of its owner.
Disclosure is the unlawful making public of information constituting a trade secret, in which it becomes known to unauthorized persons. An outsider is any person who does not have access to the specified information by decision of the owner of the information or in accordance with the grounds provided by law.
Use – carrying out any activity on the basis of information constituting a trade secret.
Committing the above acts without the consent of the owner of information constituting a trade secret means his interest in maintaining the confidentiality of this information, as well as the absence of his permission to use it for any purposes by third parties.
To qualify a crime you need:
a) the fact that information constituting a trade secret is released from the monopoly possession of the legal owner;
b) violation of the legal regime of information constituting a trade secret;
c) violation of the trade secret protection regime;
d) the owner’s desire to maintain the confidentiality of the specified information or lack of permission to use it.
For illegal use:
e) the fact of carrying out any actions on the basis of information constituting a trade secret of the owner.
The crime is committed with direct intent, that is, the subject is aware of the socially dangerous nature of his actions and wishes to commit them.
The crime under Part 2 of Art. 183 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation has a formal composition, since the onset of socially dangerous consequences is not provided for in the disposition of the article.
The subject of the crime is special.
The subjects of the crime are persons to whom information constituting a trade secret became known or was entrusted through their service or work. This category of persons, in turn, can be divided into two groups.
The first is persons who gain access to information constituting a trade secret by decision of the owner of the information. These include employees of the owner of the information, to whom it becomes known due to the work functions performed, on the basis of the relevant provisions of the employment contract, as well as counterparties of the owner of the information, to whom it becomes known due to a civil law contract concluded between them.
The second group is officials of state bodies, to whom it becomes known when they perform their official duties within the framework of their assigned competence.
It should be noted that in Part 2 of Art. 183 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation there is a certain discrepancy with federal legislation in the field of information and informatization regarding the terminology used. Thus, the disposition of the article contains as a qualifying feature the absence of consent of the owner of information constituting a trade secret to their disclosure or use. However, according to Art. 2 of the Federal Law “On Information, Informatization and Information Protection” No. 24-FZ of February 20, 1995, there are two types of subjects of trade secrets: the owner of the information and its possessor.
The owner of information is an individual or legal entity who has the rights to own, use and dispose of information constituting a trade secret in full. The owner of information is an individual or legal entity that owns and uses information that constitutes a trade secret, and also exercises the powers of disposal within the limits established by law and (or) the owner.
Accordingly, we can conclude that the owner is the main original subject of the trade secret, and the owner is the derivative to whom it becomes known in accordance with the decision of the owner or on the grounds provided by law. In addition, resolving issues of classifying information as a trade secret or removing the confidentiality stamp and other issues of the trade secret regime are within the competence of the owner of the information.
In addition, as discussed above, the subject of the crime of Part 2 of Art. 183 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation are persons who possess a trade secret on any legal basis, that is, the owners of information constituting a trade secret themselves.
Therefore, it seems that, from the point of view of terminology, in the disposition of the article it is necessary to use the definition “owner of information constituting a trade secret” instead of “owner of information”, which necessitates the need to make appropriate changes to Part 2 of Art. 183 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.
Part 2 art. 183 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation is a crime of medium gravity.
As a qualifying feature, Part 3 of Art. 183 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation indicates the onset of socially dangerous consequences - causing major damage or the motive for the crime - selfish interest.
Causing major damage to the owner of information as a result of criminal acts consists of material losses, lost profits or damage to business reputation. The occurrence and extent of damage are assessed by the court in each specific case, depending on the circumstances of the case under consideration.
This qualifying feature forms a crime that has a material composition. Therefore, to qualify it, in addition to the above points, it is necessary to prove the fact of causing major damage as a result of socially dangerous acts committed by the subject of the crime.
Selfish interest is expressed in the possibility of the subject of a crime receiving material benefits from the criminal acts he has committed.
Part 3 art. 183 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation is a crime of medium gravity.
As a qualifying feature, Part 4 of Art. 183 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation indicates the onset of grave consequences as a result of the commission of acts provided for in parts two and three of Art. 183 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.
The question of assessing and establishing the fact of the occurrence of grave consequences as a result of the commission of acts provided for in parts 2 and 3 of Art. 183 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, is ambiguous and in some cases conflicting, since in Part 3 of Art. 183 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation already provides for causing major damage as a qualifying feature.
Nevertheless, it seems that the legislator, in such a formulation, has established the possibility of consequences that are more socially dangerous than causing major damage to the owner of information constituting a trade secret.
Part 4 art. 183 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation is a serious crime.
Preliminary investigation in cases provided for in Art. 183 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation falls within the competence of internal affairs bodies.
Cases provided for in part one are within the jurisdiction of the magistrate, parts two, three and four are within the jurisdiction of the district court and are considered by a federal judge alone (Article 30, Parts 2, 3 of Article 31 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation).
The purpose of Article 183 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation is to protect the legal regime established by law for information constituting a trade secret, as well as the rights and legitimate interests of the owner of the information.
It should be noted that the original version of the article underwent certain changes in connection with the adoption of the Federal Law “On Combating the Legalization (Laundering) of Proceeds from Crime” dated August 7, 2001. These changes affected both the design of the dispositions and the structure of the entire article as a whole, as well as the types and nature of punishments provided for in the original edition.
So, from Part 1 of Art. 183 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, the purpose of the crime was removed - disclosure or illegal use of information constituting a trade secret. In Part 2, the qualifying features were removed: the motive for the crime - selfish or other personal interest, as well as the occurrence of socially dangerous consequences - causing major damage. In addition, two additional compositions with qualifying characteristics were identified - parts three and four, respectively. Part 3 identifies as a qualifying feature for the acts provided for in parts one and two the motive of the crime - selfish interest or the occurrence of socially dangerous consequences in the form of causing major damage. Part 4 identifies as a qualifying feature the occurrence of grave consequences as a result of the commission of acts provided for in parts two and three.
It is difficult to judge what caused the changes. Nevertheless, several very definite conclusions can be drawn: in comparison with the original wording, the legislator somewhat facilitated the qualification of crimes provided for in parts one and two, and also expanded the scope of the article by introducing additional elements of crime with qualifying features, in addition, with the development and introduction into effect of parts three and four, it can be stated that the punishment for committing acts under Art. 183 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.
As a general final conclusion, it can be noted that the establishment of a criminal legal mechanism for protecting the rights and legitimate interests of the owner of information constituting a trade secret is a fact indicating an adequate perception by Russian legislation of the changes that have occurred and are occurring in the economic sphere.
Nevertheless, the article rather performs a preventive function than has the character of a real “working” article, since, despite the formal establishment and legislative codification of these criminal legal mechanisms, the possibility of their practical implementation is associated with certain difficulties.
In particular, it is easy to notice that in terms of the design features of the norms, part one has much in common with Art. 276 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation “Espionage”, and part two of Art. 183 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation - from Art. 283 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation “Disclosure of state secrets”. But it is no big secret that for cases of this kind, the process of proof is a difficult problem, both at the stage of preliminary investigation and during trial. And this takes into account that in the field of ensuring the safety of state secrets, there are a number of separate state bodies, as well as intelligence services and law enforcement agencies, which have the appropriate capabilities, have fairly broad powers and qualified personnel. Therefore, we can assume that similar difficulties will have to be encountered in this case. It should be added that in cases provided for in Art. 183 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, the preliminary investigation falls within the competence of the internal affairs bodies (Part 2, Clause 3 of Article 151 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation), and their lack of practical experience in cases of this kind cannot positively influence the proper protection of violations rights and interests of owners of trade secrets.
In general, incomplete legal regulation and insignificant law enforcement practice are common shortcomings that are characteristic of the entire area regulating information relations, and not just the area of protection of trade secrets. However, if we consider the changes that are taking place in Russian legislation and law enforcement practice at the present stage, the following positive trends can be noted: increased attention of legislators to the area of regulating the protection of trade secrets, expressed in the form of the inclusion of certain provisions in relation to this area in the new Labor Code of the Russian Federation Federation (which was not typical for previous legislation), as well as increased interest among commercial organizations in the proper organization of their information arrays and their protection. In our opinion, these trends indicate that over time these negative circumstances will be overcome
"Data protection. Confident", No. 2, 2003, p. 42-47.

Responsibility for espionage

Disclosure of confidential information is punishable , there are several main parts.

Part 1 art. 183. Penalties in the amount of up to 500,000 rubles, as well as in the amount of salary or other form of income for the year. Such punishment is provided for the collection of data through direct theft.
Part 2 implies rules regarding the illegal use and dissemination of information. Fines increase to a million rubles, plus the culprit is deprived of the opportunity to hold certain positions for 3 years. Corrective labor for 2 years or forced labor for 3 annual periods (similar imprisonment).
Part 3 provides a detailed description of responsibility for the collection and dissemination of information, which ultimately led to serious damage. Payment up to 1.5 million rubles, lack of the right to work in certain positions. The perpetrator is also deprived of his freedom for 5 years.
Part 4 is even more strict and implies LS for up to a 7-year period or serving up to 5 years in relevant work.

Thus, the law implies several types of criminal liability.

MA may not occur if:

the crime is not contained in the acts;
guilt does not contain evidence;
other (real) criminals were found;
the suspect has mental disabilities.

In other practical cases, the penalty inevitably occurs and includes serious penalties, depending on the scale of the act committed.

Features of qualifying for spy status

Since espionage becomes especially relevant during military conflicts between states, the international legal system clearly defines when a person who has stolen classified information can be considered a spy. This is allowed if the offender is a civilian or serves in the armed forces, but acts on enemy territory without a military uniform, then he can be prosecuted and will not receive the status of a prisoner of war.

Otherwise, when he performs his tasks in military uniform, even if the fact of espionage is proven, he is recognized as a prisoner of war. It is important to note that this person is obliged to fully comply with the rules of wearing a military uniform. In case of violations (using the uniform only in some situations), he may be recognized as a spy and not a prisoner of war.

Since only citizens of the Russian Federation can be convicted of high treason under Article 275 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, and only foreign citizens under Article 276 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, the question arises of bringing holders of dual citizenship to justice. Russian law prohibits double punishment, so such persons will be prosecuted under one of these articles.