Why the arrest of a famous journalist caused protest among leading Russian media
Today is a year since Ivan Safronov has been under arrest on suspicion of treason. RBC looked into who such cases are brought against in Russia and why journalists are under attack
Ivan Safronov (Photo: Valery Sharifulin / TASS)
On July 7, 2021, the FSB detained a journalist, adviser to the head of Roscosmos, Ivan Safronov, who is accused of high treason (Article 275 of the Criminal Code). The Lefortovo court in Moscow sent him into custody; Safronov spent the entire last year in the Lefortovo pre-trial detention center.
Just like a year ago, the contents of the case are known only in general terms and only from the words of Safronov’s defenders. Lawyer, head of the human rights association “Team 29” Ivan Pavlov, on the day of the journalist’s arrest, said that, according to the FSB, in 2012 Safronov was recruited by the Czech intelligence services, and in 2017, on their instructions, he passed on secret information “about military-technical cooperation between Russia” with one of the North African states and the actions of Russian armed forces in the Middle East." The final recipient of the information was the United States, the investigation believes.
Over the past year, there has been little more information about Safronov’s accusation. It is known that the investigation considers his colleague and friend Martin Larisch, a former correspondent for the newspaper Lidové noviny in Moscow, to be an agent of Czech intelligence. Safronov said that he collaborated with an information digest about security, which was distributed by subscription by the agency founded by Larisch. He stated that he did not know any secret information and did not pass it on to the Czech, and that he was categorically convinced of his non-involvement in the special services.
Safronov does not admit guilt and connects the accusation with his journalistic work. According to the investigation, which Vladimir Putin also spoke about, the case against Safronov is not related to his work as a journalist. At the same time, it is known that the intelligence services had questions for Safronov because of his note about the supply of Russian helicopters to Egypt. After Safronov’s arrest, the investigation ordered an examination of all his notes for the content of secret information. In addition, the journalist was offered to hand over his sources as part of a pre-trial agreement, Pavlov said. Speaking about the pressure on Safronov, his defenders mentioned that he was promised the opportunity to call his mother, with whom he had not spoken for a year, in exchange for admitting guilt.
“The investigation is trying to present Safronov’s entire journalistic activity as espionage,” Pavlov commented, speaking at a press conference to journalists in early July. Because of the Safronov case, in April 2021, Pavlov himself found himself accused of divulging investigative secrets. Now he is prohibited from using the telephone and the Internet, and during a search, his entire lawyer’s dossier in the journalist’s case was confiscated.
RBC looked into how treason cases work in Russia and what dangers the classification of secrecy creates.
Pickets in support of detained journalist Ivan Safronov. Photo report 13 more photos Photo gallery
How people without access to secrets began to be charged with treason
Art. 275 of the Criminal Code provides for a term of 12 to 20 years for issuing state secrets to a foreign state or international organization. The subjects of a crime can be not only those who were admitted to secret information through their service, but also those to whom it became known “in other cases.” The same offense punishes “providing financial, logistical, consulting or other assistance to a foreign state, international or foreign organization in activities directed against the security of the Russian Federation.”
In its current edition, this composition has been in effect since 2012. Previously, the wording was different: treason was understood as assisting foreign states or organizations “in carrying out hostile activities to the detriment of the external security” of Russia. As lawyer Ruslan Koblev notes, those charged with treason were mainly persons with security clearance, who were entrusted with state secrets as part of their official duties.
“The legislator made completely non-specific changes. Now the disposition implies a broad interpretation: the article covers Russian citizens who became aware of state secrets by accident, for example, during work at an enterprise or communication,” the lawyer explained.
No hostile activity
Draft amendments to the articles of the Criminal Code on disclosure of state secrets, treason and espionage were submitted to the State Duma by the government at the end of 2008 and adopted at the end of 2012.
The authors explained the need for amendments by the fact that foreign intelligence services are actively using non-governmental organizations in Russia; employees of commercial companies and NGOs have repeatedly tried to gain access to state secrets, so they (along with foreign intelligence services and governments) must be taken into account in the law as potential intelligence agents. The authors of the amendments raised the issue of liability for issuing state secrets to persons who were not formally admitted to it. An analysis of criminal cases showed that “information constituting state secrets is not protected from intentional actions of persons to whom it was not entrusted,” and “one of the serious problems is the dissemination of state secrets along the so-called chain,” the explanatory note said.
The presence of the term “hostile activity” in the previous article of the Criminal Code made it difficult for investigators to prove a crime, “since references to the lack of proof of the presence of signs of “hostile” activity in a person’s actions are used by the defense as the main argument for the release of the accused and defendants,” the government stated.
According to Koblev, the updated composition contains a contradiction: on the one hand, treason can only be committed with direct intent. On the other hand, it follows from the letter of the law that “a person may not know that he has received information containing a state secret, and just as well, without knowing, he can share it.” In his opinion, these provisions of the Criminal Code should be edited.
The article on treason is formulated in such a way that it makes it possible to hold almost any person accountable - for example, for consulting representatives of a foreign state or organization, Viktor Murakhovsky, editor-in-chief of Arsenal of the Fatherland magazine, agreed in a conversation with RBC: “For persons who have clearance, everything clearly regulated. Their contacts with foreigners and foreign trips are coordinated with their superiors, and each exchange of experience is recorded in reports. Those who do not have access, it turns out, find themselves in an even more vulnerable position.”
Commentary to Art. 283 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation
The object of disclosure of state secrets are public relations that guarantee the foundations of information security of the Russian state. Information security of the Russian Federation is understood as the state of protection of its national interests in the information sphere, determined by the totality of balanced interests of the individual, society and the state. At the same time, one of the most important components of the national interests of the Russian Federation in the information sphere is the protection of information resources containing information related to state secrets from unauthorized access.
The subject of the crime is information constituting a state secret.
From the objective side, the crime consists of disclosing information constituting a state secret in such a way that it became known to other persons. Disclosure should be understood as making public or distributing this information in violation of the established procedure. Disclosure itself can take the form of both active actions (communication in a confidential conversation; demonstration of documents, diagrams, devices, etc.; open report or lecture; publication in the media or printed publications, etc.) and inaction (failure to take measures to classify the transportation of relevant materials; allow outsiders to familiarize themselves with classified information, etc.). The method of disclosure can be any: orally, in writing, using the media, etc.
The disposition of the analyzed article can be classified as blanket-reference: when qualifying a crime, it is necessary to refer to the regulations governing the procedure for circulation of information constituting state secrets (to establish the fact of the illegality of familiarization with the relevant information by unauthorized persons), as well as to the requirements of Art. 275 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (to establish the absence of signs of high treason).
The general rule for handling information containing state secrets is that any form of disclosure and any actions that could lead to the disclosure of information constituting a state secret are prohibited. This information may become available to third parties only if it is declassified or in cases specifically provided for by law (for example, with the participation of a lawyer in a criminal or civil case related to state secrets, or in a situation where information constituting a state secret is transferred to other states, etc.) .d.). When qualifying the disclosure of state secrets, it is necessary to establish the fact of the illegality of the actions of the culprit, which does not present any difficulties due to the fact that each person gaining access to information constituting a state secret is required to sign a non-disclosure agreement.
When distinguishing the disclosure of information constituting a state secret from high treason in the form of issuing state secrets, the main distinguishing features are as follows: a) the subject of the crime under Art. 283 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, there can only be a person to whom a state secret has become known through service or work, and the subject of the issuance of state secrets can be any person; b) the recipient of information upon disclosure, in contrast to extradition, is not only a foreign state, organization or their representatives, but also other third parties; c) high treason, in contrast to the disclosure of state secrets, is pursued by the presence of a strictly defined intent of the perpetrator - to cause damage to the external security of Russia.
The corpus delicti provided for in Part 1 of Art. 283 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, is classified as material. The consequence of disclosure is the fact that information constituting a state secret is perceived by an outsider; At the same time, outsiders should recognize both persons who did not have access to state secrets at all, and persons who had such access, but did not have the right to get acquainted with the information that the perpetrator told them. The addressee, receiving information from the perpetrator, due to his subjective properties, must be able to realize that this information relates to a state secret (due to which the disclosure of information constituting a state secret to minors, the mentally ill, persons who do not speak the language, etc. cannot constitute a complete crime and must be qualified, if there are grounds for it, as an attempted crime).
The subjective side of disclosure of state secrets is characterized by guilt in the form of intent or negligence. When committing a crime intentionally, a person is aware of the inadmissibility of disclosing information constituting a state secret to other persons, foresees that as a result of his actions the information will become available to these persons, desires or consciously allows these consequences to occur (for example, the perpetrator boasts of his knowledge to friends or discusses information constituting a state secret, with a colleague in a public place). In case of careless disclosure of state secrets, the culprit does not foresee that as a result of his actions the state secret could become the property of third parties, although he should have and could have foreseen this, or he foresees the onset of consequences, but arrogantly hopes to prevent them (for example, the culprit uses a vulnerable cipher when transmitting secret information or inadvertently sends secret information to unauthorized persons).
The subject of the analyzed crime is a special one - a sane individual who has reached the age of sixteen, to whom state secrets were entrusted or became known through service or work. Persons to whom the secret was entrusted should be understood as subjects who have special access to state secrets and hold positions in organizations and institutions whose functioning is related to the creation or circulation of materials containing state secrets. Persons to whom the secret became known through their service or work should be understood as subjects who do not hold positions in the specified institutions, but have gained access to state secrets (lawyers participating as defense attorneys in criminal proceedings in cases related to information constituting a state secret ; members of the Federation Council, deputies of the State Duma, judges for the period of execution of their powers; persons who have received access to state secrets in connection with the preparation of dissertations or performance of other scientific research, etc.). All these persons are warned about the non-disclosure of state secrets that have become known to them in connection with the exercise of their powers, and about bringing them to justice in the event of its disclosure, for which a corresponding receipt is taken from them. It is the presence of a specially issued clearance (or access) and the receipt of a subscription to non-disclosure of state secrets that are the key features of the subject of the crime being analyzed. Termination of access to state secrets does not relieve an official or citizen from their obligations to not disclose information constituting a state secret.
If the disclosure of information constituting a state secret is committed by other persons who do not meet the requirements of a special subject, they, depending on the situation, may be held liable for complicity in a crime under Art. 283 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.
The law provides for a qualified definition of disclosure of state secrets - disclosure that, due to negligence, entailed grave consequences (Part 2 of Article 283 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation). This attribute is evaluative. Its content must be determined in each specific case, taking into account all the circumstances of the case: the content of the information, its significance, characteristics of the addressee, etc. The disruption of government activities, the need to relocate a sensitive facility, the failure of an intelligence network, etc. can be considered as serious consequences. .
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In assessing the consequences of disclosing state secrets, the relevant instructions of the Government of the Russian Federation should play an important role. As follows from paragraph 3 of Art. 4 of the Law “On State Secrets”, it is the Government of the Russian Federation that must establish the procedure for determining the extent of damage resulting from the unauthorized dissemination of information constituting a state secret, i.e. determine methods according to which it will be possible to calculate the amount of damage. There is currently no corresponding document.
From the subjective side, the crime of divulging state secrets is characterized either as a general negligence, or as a crime with two forms of guilt. This approach is due to the recognition of the possibility of committing the main elements of the crime both intentionally and through negligence. Two forms of guilt in a qualified crime will occur only if the main element was carried out intentionally; if the main element of the crime is committed through negligence, then the qualified element requires a careless form of guilt.
Article 283 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation does not cover cases of deliberate collection by a person who does not have access to state secrets of relevant information and its disclosure. Such acts may contain elements of crimes provided for in Art. 275 or art. 276 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, if a state secret becomes the property of a foreign state, foreign organization or their representatives. If a person who does not have clearance (access) to state secrets collects relevant information in the absence of intent to transfer it to a foreign state, the act may be considered, depending on the circumstances, or as an official crime (for example, provided for in Article 285 “Abuse of Official Powers” of the Criminal Code RF), either as an information crime (for example, provided for in Article 272 “Illegal access to computer information” of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation), or as preparation for some other crime.
Official, engineer, mother of many children
After changes were made to the Criminal Code, the annual number of people convicted of treason, espionage and disclosure of state secrets is growing progressively, according to data from the Supreme Court, which Mediazona drew attention to. In 2021, more than 60 verdicts were handed down based on these offenses, and more than 40 in 2021, while in 2009–2011 there were from ten to 20 per year.
In 2021, 58 people were convicted on charges related to counterintelligence activities, according to data from the Judicial Department. Including one person was convicted of espionage, six of high treason, 45 of disclosing state secrets and six of illegal collection of classified information.
Only a few of these cases receive publicity.
Famous treason cases in recent years
Alexander Derkunsky is an entrepreneur, arrested in June 2021. Founder. According to investigators, he received data from scientific developments intended for the Ministry of Defense, and then, based on them, outside Russia he organized mass production of equipment that was bought by foreign organizations, including the secret services
Valery Golubkin, Anatoly Gubanov are physicists from the Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute (TsAGI), teachers at MIPT. According to sources, the case is related to the transfer of secret information to a European state as part of an international project to develop a hypersonic civil aircraft HEXAFLY-INT (High-SpeedEXperimental FLY Vehicles). MIPT speaks out in defense of its employees.
Ivan Yatskin , a resident of Simferopol, a citizen of Russia and Ukraine, received 11 years in prison in May 2021. According to the FSB, he collected information in Crimea about the personal data of employees of the operational search bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for Crimea and then transferred it to employees of the Security Service of Ukraine for money. Included by Memorial in the list of political prisoners.
Valery Mitko , the 78-year-old president of the St. Petersburg Arctic Public Academy of Sciences, is accused of taking out in his suitcase a document with the characteristics of submarines, including a Russian one, during one of his lecture visits to China.
Alexander Vorobyov is a former assistant to the Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy in the Urals Nikolai Tsukanov, the highest-ranking civilian official arrested in a treason case in recent years. According to investigators, he gave information about Security Council meetings to a Polish intelligence agent. In April 2021, he received 12.5 years in prison.
Alexey Vorobyov is an associate professor at the Moscow Aviation Institute, taught the theory and design of rocket engines. In April he received 20 years in prison; in addition to treason, he was charged with preparing for the illegal transfer of raw materials, equipment or technologies that could be used in the creation of weapons, and attempting to smuggle such materials. The court mentioned that Vorobyov has “extensive, stable connections outside the territory of the Russian Federation, including in the People’s Republic of China.”
Viktor Kudryavtsev, Vladimir Lapygin, Sergey Meshcheryakov and Roman Kovalev are researchers at the Central Scientific Research Institute of Mechanical Engineering (TsNIIMash), the main scientific enterprise of Roscosmos. They are accused of treason on various grounds; the Kudryavtsev case, for example, involves research in the field of aerodynamics carried out jointly with European institutions. Kudryavtsev died of cancer in April 2021. He was at large, the investigation against him was suspended.
Vladimir Neelov , a military expert, author of publications about the Wagner PMC, received seven years in prison for transferring data on the training and retraining of FSB operational officers to a German consulting firm for money.
Antonina Zimina and Konstantin Antonets are experts at the Public Diplomacy Support Fund named after. A.M. Gorchakova and her husband are accused of disclosing to the Latvian intelligence services the identity of an operative of the Kaliningrad FSB department.
Sergey Mikhailov, Ruslan Stoyanov, Dmitry Dokuchaev and Georgy Fomchenkov , employees of the FSB and Kaspersky Lab, received up to 22 years for treason. The plot of the case is not officially known, Kommersant associated it with the disclosure by the US FBI of data on surveillance of Chronopay founder Pavel Vrublevsky, and The Bell with the transfer to the United States of data on attacks by Russian hackers on Democratic servers before the presidential election.
In the previous few years, former GRU engineer Gennady Kravtsov, employee of the Sarov Nuclear Center Vladimir Golubev, air traffic controller Pyotr Parpulov, mother of many children Svetlana Davydova, and saleswoman Oksana Sevastidi were prosecuted for treason.
Case (No.)
SENTENCE
In the name of the Russian Federation
Nizhny Novgorod city June 06, 2021
Kanavinsky District Court of N. Novgorod, composed of presiding judge Fomicheva T.A.
with the secretary of the court session Vladimirskaya I.N.
with the participation of the state prosecutor, assistant prosecutor of the Kanavinsky district of N. Novgorod, Serebrennikova M.S.,
defendant Gorbunov V.S.
his defender, lawyer S.M. Sizova, who presented a certificate (No.) and a warrant (No.) dated (DD.MM.YYYY.),
having examined in open court in a special manner the materials of the criminal case against Vyacheslav Sergeevich Gorbunov, December 4, 1995 (data anonymized), accused of committing crimes under Part 1 of Art. 183, part 1 art. 272 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation;
INSTALLED:
Gorbunov V.S. committed two minor crimes in the Kanavinsky district of Nizhny Novgorod under the following circumstances.
In accordance with paragraph 1 of Art. 3 Federal Law of July 29, 2004 No. 98-FZ “On Trade Secrets”, a trade secret is a regime of confidentiality of information that allows its owner, under existing or possible circumstances, to increase income, avoid unjustified expenses, maintain a position in the market for goods, works, services, or obtain other commercial benefit.
Clause 2 Art. 3 Federal Law of July 29, 2004 No. 98-FZ “On Trade Secrets” explains that information constituting a trade secret is information of any nature that has actual or potential commercial value due to its unknownness to third parties, to which third parties do not have access free access on a legal basis and in respect of which the owner of such information has introduced a trade secret regime.
According to the list of restricted access information specified in Appendix No. 1 to the Procedure “Handling Restricted Access Information”, information on the availability, content and terms of existing and concluded agreements with the Company’s partners and clients, including information on the amount of remunerations and discounts by the Company’s partners, as well as information of limited access to partners and clients, in respect of which the Company has undertaken obligations to protect it, is confidential and contains a trade secret.
According to Art. 9 of the Federal Law “On Information, Information Technologies and Information Protection” No. 149-FZ of July 27, 2006, restriction of access to information is established by federal laws in order to protect the foundations of the constitutional system, morality, health, rights and legitimate interests of other persons, and ensure defense country and state security, it is mandatory to maintain the confidentiality of information, access to which is limited by federal laws.
In accordance with paragraph 1 of Art. 16 of the above law, information protection is the adoption of legal, organizational and technical measures aimed at: ensuring the protection of information from unauthorized access, destruction, modification, blocking, copying, provision, distribution, as well as from other unlawful actions in relation to such information.
In accordance with paragraph 1 of Art. 16 of the above law, the owner of information, the operator of the information system, in cases established by the legislation of the Russian Federation, is obliged to ensure: prevention of unauthorized access to information and (or) transfer of it to persons who do not have the right to access information.
Gorbunov V.S. hired by LLC "SiES Process Management" in accordance with the contract dated (DD.MM.YYYY.) No. (No.). In accordance with clause 7.3 of the agreement dated (DD.MM.YYYY.) No. (No.) Gorbunov V.S. must take all possible measures to maintain the confidentiality of information that constitutes a trade secret of the LLC “(data anonymized)” organization.
Between CS Process Management LLC and are classified as secrets protected by law.
During the time period from (DD.MM.YYYY.) to (DD.MM.YYYY.), the exact time has not been established, Gorbunov V.S. a criminal intent arose aimed at the illegal collection of information constituting a trade secret of LLC “(data anonymized)”, namely the illegal collection of personal information about clients.
Implementing his criminal intent aimed at illegally collecting information constituting a trade secret of LLC “(data anonymized)”, namely the illegal collection of personal information about clients, V.S. Gorbunov. (DD.MM.YYYY.) at about 15:00, while at his workplace, office 401 at the address: (address impersonal), he gained access to the account of his colleague, FULL NAME1, who, not knowing about the criminal purpose of V.S. Gorbunov. , on the same day, that is (DD.MM.YYYY.), told the latter his login and password.
After this, V.S. Gorbunov, continuing to implement his criminal intent to illegally collect information constituting a trade secret, using the account, login and password FULL NAME1 from his work computer, logged into the system, where he found a folder called “(data anonymized) Realizing that in this folder there is information containing a trade secret, to which he, due to his work, did not have access, without taking the measures provided for in the agreement with the LLC (data anonymized) to maintain the confidentiality of information, V.S. Gorbunov. (DD.MM.YYYY.) at about 15:00, while in the office located at the address: N. Novgorod, (address anonymized), acting intentionally, having access to the information system, using someone else's account login, FULL NAME1, called “(data anonymized)” installed on a work computer, illegally copied the database of PJSC clients (data anonymized)” to his cell phone brand “(No.)” for personal use.
In addition, V.S. Gorbunov, being an employee of LLC “(data anonymized)” on the basis of an agreement dated (DD.MM.YYYY.) No. BK-(No.), is obliged to provide services for finding subscribers for connecting broadband Internet access ( telematic services and data transmission services) and digital television, while not having direct access to information constituting a secret protected by law.
Between SS Process Management LLC and ) an agreement for the provision of paid services dated (DD.MM.YYYY.) No. (No.) was concluded, according to which LLC "(No.)" undertakes to provide PJSC "(data anonymized)" on a reimbursable basis, services for sales support, promotion of goods and services, services for organizing document flow in a PJSC company (data anonymized),” as well as other services.
During the course performed by Gorbunov V.S. work, he did not have direct access to personal information about clients, which, in accordance with clauses 1, 2 of Art. 3 Federal Law dated July 29, 2004 No. 98-FZ “On Trade Secrets” refers to secrets protected by law.
During the time period from (DD.MM.YYYY.) to (DD.MM.YYYY.), the exact time has not been established, Gorbunov V.S. a criminal intent arose aimed at providing illegal access to computer information constituting a trade secret of LLC “(data anonymized), namely, illegal access to personal information about clients, and subsequent copying of this information for personal purposes.
Implementing his criminal intent aimed at providing illegal access to computer information constituting a trade secret of LLC "(data anonymized)", namely, illegal access to personal information about clients, and subsequent copying of this information, V.S. Gorbunov. (DD.MM.YYYY.) at about 15:00, while at his workplace, office 401 at the address: g (address impersonal), he gained access to the account of his colleague, FULL NAME1, who, not knowing about the criminal purpose of V.S. Gorbunov ., on the same day, that is (DD.MM.YYYY.), told the latter his login and password.
After this, V.S. Gorbunov, continuing to implement his criminal intent to illegally access computer information constituting a trade secret, using the account, login and password FULL NAME1 from his work computer, logged into the system, where he found a folder called “(data anonymized )". Realizing that this folder contains information containing a trade secret to which, due to his work, he did not have access, Gorbunov V.S. (DD.MM.YYYY.) at about 15:00, while in the office located at the address: (address anonymized) (address anonymized), acting intentionally, he gained unlawful access to the information system using someone else’s account login FULL NAME1 called “ (data anonymized) installed on a work computer, after which he illegally copied the client database of PJSC “(data anonymized)” to his cell phone brand “(No.)” for personal use.
At the court hearing, the defendant V.S. Gorbunov. He admitted this charge of committing two crimes fully and voluntarily, after consultation with the defense lawyer and in his presence supported the petition submitted to the court for a verdict without a trial. The defendant testified that he was fully aware of the nature and consequences of the stated petition.
Gorbunov V.S. accused of committing two crimes that fall into the category of minor gravity, the punishment for which does not exceed 10 years in prison, the charge is justified, confirmed by the totality of evidence collected in the case, the admissibility of which is not disputed by the defense. The defendant understands the essence of the charge brought against him and agrees with it in full; he promptly, voluntarily and in the presence of a defense lawyer filed a petition for a special procedure, the defense lawyer supported this petition.
The representative of the victim PJSC “(data anonymized)” FULL NAME2, duly notified of the time and place of consideration of the case, in a written statement addressed to the court, asked to consider the case in his absence, and agrees to consider the criminal case in a special judicial procedure.
The state prosecutor and the defense did not object to the sentencing without a trial.
The correctness of the legal qualifications of those charged with V.S. Gorbunov. criminal actions under Part 1 of Art. 183, Part 1 of Art. 272 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation does not raise any doubts.
Based on the foregoing, the court considers that all conditions for passing a sentence without a trial, provided for in Art. 314, 315 Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation.
The court qualifies the actions of V.S. Gorbunov. according to Part 1 of Art. 183 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation - collection of information constituting a trade secret in another illegal way, according to Part 1 of Art. 272 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation - unlawful access to computer information protected by law, if this act entailed copying of computer information.
The mental state of health of the defendant V.S. Gorbunov, taking into account the data obtained in court about his personality, behavior at the time and after the commission of crimes, during the trial, does not raise doubts in the court. Therefore, the court recognizes the defendant V.S. Gorbunov. sane, subject to criminal liability and punishment.
When determining the type and amount of punishment for Gorbunov V.S. for each crime the court, guided by Art. 6, 43, 60 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation takes into account the nature and degree of public danger of the crimes committed, information about the personality of the defendant, circumstances mitigating the punishment, the impact of the punishment on the correction of V.S. Gorbunov. and on the living conditions of his family, on the achievement of other goals, such as the restoration of social justice and the prevention of new crimes, as well as the health status of the defendant V.S. Gorbunov. and members of his family.
As circumstances mitigating the punishment for each crime, in accordance with paragraphs. "and" part 1 art. 61 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation in relation to V.S. Gorbunov. The court recognizes and takes into account when assigning punishment: confession (vol. (No.)).
Gorbunov V.S. We have no criminal record, are not registered with a psychiatrist or narcologist (vol. (No.)); he is characterized positively at his place of residence and place of study (Vol. 1 (No.)), has letters of gratitude and certificates.
These circumstances taken together by the court, as well as admission of guilt, repentance for what they did, in accordance with the requirements of Part 2 of Art. 61 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, recognizes for each crime mitigating circumstances for the defendant’s punishment.
Aggravating circumstances in relation to V.S. Gorbunov, provided for in Art. 63 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, not established by the court.
Provisions of Part 1.5 of Art. 62 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation are not applied when assigning punishment, due to the fact that the defendant for each crime is not assigned the most severe punishment provided for by the sanctions of Part 1 of Article 183, Part 1 of Art. 272 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.
Any exceptional circumstances that significantly reduce the degree of public danger of the crimes committed and allow the provisions of Art. 64 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation to the defendant, the court does not see that mitigating circumstances were taken into account when determining the amount of punishment.
The court finds no grounds for the provision provided for in Part 6 of Art. 15 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation changes the category of crime to a less serious one for each crime.
Taking into account the above, the provisions of Art. Art. 43, 46 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, taking into account the circumstances and criminological characteristics of the crimes committed by V.S. Gorbunov. crimes, information about the personality, property and marital status of the defendant, the possibility of him receiving income, the court considers it possible to appoint V.S. Gorbunova. for each crime the punishment is in the form of a fine to the state's income, determined by the court within the sanction of the articles of the criminal law incriminated against him.
At the same time, the court considers that the amount of punishment for V.S. Gorbunov must be sufficient to correct the convicted person, finally assigns punishment in accordance with the application of Art. 69 part 2 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation for the totality of crimes, by partial addition of the imposed punishments. Taking into account the personality of the defendant, the court does not see any grounds for imposing punishment by full addition.
There are no grounds for sentencing the defendant without imposing punishment or releasing him from punishment.
Gorbunov V.S. in accordance with Art. Art. 91, 92 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation was not delayed.
In accordance with Part 20 of Art. 316 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation when rendering a sentence in a special procedure for making a judicial decision, the procedural costs provided for in Art. 131 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation, are subject to compensation from the federal budget.
The court decides the fate of the material evidence in accordance with the requirements of Art. Art. 81-82 Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation.
Based on the above and guided by Articles 296-304, 308-310, 314, 316-317 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation, the court
SENTENCED:
Find Vyacheslav Sergeevich Gorbunov guilty of committing crimes under Part 1 of Art. 183, part 1 art. 272 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.
Assign punishment to Vyacheslav Sergeevich Gorbunov under Part 1 of Art. 183 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation in the form of a fine in the amount of 15,000 (fifteen thousand) rubles.
Assign punishment to Vyacheslav Sergeevich Gorbunov under Part 1 of Art. 272 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation in the form of a fine in the amount of 15,000 (fifteen thousand) rubles.
In accordance with Art. 69 part 2 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation for the totality of crimes, by partial addition of the imposed punishments, finally assign Vyacheslav Sergeevich Gorbunov a punishment in the form of a fine in the amount of 20,000 (twenty thousand) rubles.
Procedural costs will be reimbursed from the federal budget.
Physical evidence in the case: brand cell phone (data anonymized)" in a black case - stored in the evidence storage room of the Investigative Committee at (address anonymized) Nizhny Novgorod, Investigative Directorate of the Investigative Committee of Russia for the Nizhny Novgorod Region, after the verdict enters into legal force, transfer Gorbunov V.S., or his representative; CD DVD+R, screenshot from a cell phone FULL NAME1 – stored in the materials of the criminal case, after the verdict enters into legal force, store in the criminal case.
The verdict can be appealed on appeal to the Nizhny Novgorod Regional Court through the Kanavinsky District Court of Nizhny Novgorod within ten days from the date of proclamation, with the exception of the grounds that the court’s conclusions set out in the verdict do not correspond to the actual circumstances of the criminal case established by the court of first instance, within the Art. 317 Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation.
If an appeal is filed, the convicted person has the right to petition for his participation in the court of appeal; has the right to invite a defense attorney to participate in the consideration of a criminal case by an appellate court; has the right to petition the court to appoint a defense lawyer, including free of charge, in cases provided for by the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation; has the right to refuse counsel.
Within three days from the date of proclamation of the verdict, the parties have the right to request familiarization with the minutes of the court hearing.
Details for transferring the amount of the fine: Recipient of funds: UFK for the Nizhny Novgorod region (investigative department of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation for the Nizhny Novgorod region l/s 04321A59470)
INN 5262259747 KPP 526201001 OKTMO 22701000 KBK 417 1 16 21010 01 6000 140 L/s 04321A59470 in the Federal Tax Service for the Nizhny Novgorod Region Account number 40(No.) Recipient bank: Volgo-Vyatsk State Administration of the Bank of Russia (address impersonal) B IK 042202001
Chairman (signature) T.A. Fomicheva
Copy is right.
Judge: T.A. Fomicheva
Secretary of the court session I.N. Vladimirskaya
The true verdict is in the materials of the criminal case (No.) in the Kanavinsky District Court of N. Novgorod.
Who determines state secrets
Cases in this category are under investigation by the FSB, are classified as “top secret” and are heard behind closed doors, recalls lawyer Vladimir Zherebenkov: “Much depends on how society reacts to a criminal case, but no one will allow the public into such cases. A very big difficulty for the defense is that the lawyer cannot tell the press any details of the accusation. Perhaps there was incitement, a provocation of the crime on the part of the operatives, or they are simply making mistakes and working for indicators - but it is very difficult to report this, because the case is being investigated secretly.”
Society
Journalist Ivan Safronov was suspected of treason. Main
The law implies that any information, the release of which could harm Russia's defense capability, is a state secret. But there are no criteria for this damage, Zherebenkov emphasized. As a rule, as part of the investigation, an examination is carried out to determine whether the information issued was classified as secret and whether its disclosure caused damage to the security of Russia. Such examinations are almost always carried out by specialists from the FSB itself, who are in a dependent position in relation to the investigation.
“The list of information that can be classified as a state secret is vague; In essence, there is only one criterion: whether their disclosure could cause damage to Russia’s security. FSB experts will definitely say: yes, it can. In the case of the American Paul Whelan, we asked for an independent examination from the Ministry of Defense, but they refused. The study was carried out by career FSB officers, they acted in the interests of their intelligence service, you know what the result is,” the lawyer said.
In cases of high treason, “everyone talks about the interests of the state, but no one will look at the rights and interests of a particular individual,” concluded Zherebenkov. He pointed to the symbolic meaning of the fact that cases are heard in courts at the level of a constituent entity of Russia by panels of three judges: “Troikas” have essentially not changed [since the 1930s], they mean that the interests of the state prevail in the process and, as a rule, make decisions indictment."
Unattended
The secret nature of examinations in this category of cases deprives the defense of the opportunity “not just to influence the examination, but even to challenge its conclusions,” Koblev added. Not only the defense, but also prosecutorial oversight is limited in its capabilities, he believes: “Until there is more or less transparent oversight of the investigation in such cases, the quality of the investigation will be low. In fact, these cases are now being investigated uncontrollably.”
Formally, there is no difference between prosecutorial supervision over criminal cases of the special services and other cases; now all prosecutorial supervision is in decline, says Alexey Fedyarov, head of the legal department of Sitting Rus', formerly head of the investigative department of the Chuvashia prosecutor’s office. Rather, we can talk about “special control by the FSB over how the prosecutor will behave in the process,” he said.
Society
The media learned about the wiretapping and reading of Safronov's mail by FSB officers
“I would be very happy to see a prosecutor who would refuse to sign an indictment in a criminal case of treason or espionage, which was investigated by the Russian FSB. I think that such prosecutors do not exist in nature. The role of the prosecutor will be reduced to the mechanical signing of the indictment,” Fedyarov noted.
Judicial practice under Article 283 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation
Resolution of the ECHR dated November 7, 2017
10. In March 2003, the applicant was charged with disclosing state secrets, a crime provided for in part one of Article 283 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (hereinafter referred to as the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation), for telling a relative of a convicted person that the latter was secret surveillance was established.
Determination of the Judicial Collegium for Criminal Cases of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation dated July 30, 2019 N 89-UD19-7
Meanwhile, investigator P., due to the presence of data on the presence of files in the seized candy bar containing information constituting state secrets, which were discovered during the inspection of the candy bar on September 18, 2015, and having seen in the actions of Borzykh V.E. signs of crimes under Art. Art. 283, 283.1, 284 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, the conduct of a preliminary investigation on which in accordance with Part 2 of Art. 151 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation is carried out by investigators of the federal security service, by their resolution dated May 20, 2021 on the separation of materials from the criminal case of the specified monoblock, as well as the search and inspection protocols of the monoblock (in copies), as not related to the investigated case N 201500090/74 in relation to Borzykh V.E. (that is, on the facts of receiving bribes), isolated from this case and sent for a decision in accordance with Art. Art. 144, 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation to the head of the investigative department for the Central Autonomous District of the city of Tyumen of the Investigative Directorate of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation for the Tyumen Region. The last mentioned monoblock and copies of the protocols were sent to the head of the investigative department of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation for the Tyumen region. The sending of this material evidence (monoblock) to the FSB RU is also indicated in the indictment.
Determination of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation dated March 26, 2020 N 805-O
Part one of Article 283 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation establishes criminal liability for the disclosure of information constituting a state secret by a person to whom it was entrusted or became known through service, work, study or in other cases provided for by the legislation of the Russian Federation, if this information has become available to others persons, in the absence of signs of crimes provided for in Articles 275 and 276 of this Code.
Resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation dated October 14, 2020 N 39P20
On December 27, 2012, criminal prosecution against Geval Yu.N. according to Part 2 of Art. 291, part 2 art. 138, part 2 art. 291, part 2 art. 138, part 2 art. 291, part 2 art. 138, part 2 art. 291, part 2 art. 138, part 2 art. 138, part 2 art. 291, part 2 art. 138, part 2 art. 291, part 2 art. 138, part 2 art. 291, part 2 art. 138, part 2 art. 138, part 2 art. 291, part 2 art. 138, paragraphs “a”, “c”, “d” part 4 of Art. 290, part 1 art. 286 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation was terminated on the basis of paragraph 1 of Part 1 of Art. 27 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation for non-involvement in committing crimes, criminal prosecution against Geval Yu.N. according to Part 1 of Art. 283 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation was terminated on the basis of clause 3, part 1, art. 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation for the expiration of the statute of limitations for criminal prosecution.
A minefield for journalists
The Safronov case showed that every journalist who works on military, industrial, scientific, technical, economic, security and criminal topics may be at risk. Inaccurate wording and definitions from the Law “On State Secrets” and the Criminal Code “create great instability for the work of a journalist,” Galina Arapova, head of the Center for the Protection of Media Rights, told RBC. Thus, the list of classified information from the Law “On State Secrets” is “written in broad strokes”; it does not contain a detailed description of potentially secret information, “so that an ordinary person and a journalist clearly understands what should not be done.”
Sometimes the issue of belonging to a state secret is decided after the information has entered the public field, and what exactly this or that agency considers to be a state secret is largely a matter of its discretion and understanding of state interests, the lawyer states.
“At what point they will want to pull out this card in relation to a particular journalist - if he does not write, for example, theatrical announcements - no one knows,” says Arapova. Thus, the military-industrial complex and arms supplies abroad are actively discussed in the state press, and publications similar to some articles by Ivan Safronov could appear on the Zvezda TV channel, she says: “Where the patriotic interest of the state ends in discussing this topic and information begins, which the state does not want to discuss? This boundary is not at all clear.”
The Law “On the Mass Media” contains a ban on censorship and directly obliges a journalist to publish any socially significant information, Murakhovsky recalled: a contradiction between the requirements of different laws arises where socially significant information turns out to be sensitive to the state.
